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Free Speech on Private Property
Daniel A. Silver*
N OUR SYSTEM of constitutional law the First Amendment right of free-
dom of speech has always maintained a preferred position. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, on numerous occasions, has pro-
claimed freedom of speech to be one of our most fundamental rights.'
An evolving problem in the area of free speech is the question of what
constitutes a proper forum for the expression of First Amendment rights.
This paper examines the use of private property as a forum for ex-
pression.
The Public Forum
It has been firmly established that an individual may use the public
streets and parks for the purpose of a forum, subject to regulation to
prevent disruptive behavior. This concept of the free use of public
streets and parks was recognized in 1939 in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization.2 For all practical purposes Hague overruled the
famous case of Davis v. Massachusetts.3 In Davis the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a Boston ordinance which prohibited any type of
public address on public property without the consent of the Mayor. The
Court held that the property in question belonged to the city, and that
Davis had no right to use it against the wishes of the public authorities.
It was the opinion of the Court that the city could prohibit speaking in
a public street or park as an owner of a private home can eject tres-
passers.4
Following the Davis case, the scope of the public forum was very
much limited until 1939, at which time the United States Supreme Court,
in the Hague case, upheld an injunction against the Mayor of Newark,
New Jersey.
The Court stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens and discussing public questions. Such
*B.A., Marietta College; Third-year student at Cleveland State University, Cleve-
land-Marshall College of Law; Law Intern, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland.
1 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1924); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 707 (1930).
2 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
3 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
4 Id., 47.
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use of the streets and public places has from ancient times been
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. 5
Shortly after Hague the Court reaffirmed its decision6 and has since
gone on to expand the idea of the public forum.7 However, even though
the proposed forum is publicly owned, its use can be limited when the
property is not freely accessible to the public. In Adderley v. Floridas
the Court held that a state could forbid a demonstration on public prop-
erty which was used as a jail. It said that the state could, as any private
owner, retain control of its land for the specific use to which it was
originally designated. In this case the demonstrators had entered jail-
house grounds which were closed to the public.9 The Court distinguished
this public property from a public street or park.'0
The Forum on Private Property
Difficulties arise when the forum of the speech is private property
rather than public. One of the major problems that the courts have faced
in this area has been our long tradition of absolute property rights. Con-
cerning this tradition, Mr. Justice Cardozo has stated that:
Today there is a growing tendency in political and juristic thought
to probe the principle more deeply and formulate it more broadly.
Men are saying today that property like every other social institution
has a social function to fulfill."
Recently the question as to whether the freedom of expression can
be restricted solely because an individual's choice of forum happens to
be on private property rather than on a public street, has been posed
several times. But first some history.
One of the first cases to deal with this problem was Marsh v. Ala-
bama.12 The petitioner, who was a Jehovah's Witness, was arrested for
distributing religious literature on the streets of Chickasaw, Alabama.
The special significance of this case is that the town was completely
owned by a private corporation. The entire downtown area, including
the buildings, streets and sidewalks were all privately owned. At each
end of the downtown district were state highways, from which members
5 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, supra n. 2, at 515.
6 Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 14 (1939).
7 Niemotko v. Maryland, 240 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88(1939).
8 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1967).
9 Id., 47.
10 Compare with Edwards v. South Carolina, supra n. 8.
11 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, 87-88 (1932).
12 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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of the public could enter the shopping area. There were no restrictions
attached as to who could use the facilities in the town. The petitioner
was advised by the owners that he was on private property and that he
would have to leave. When the petitioner refused to do so, the police
were called and he was arrested under the state trespass statute. The
Court found that even though the property was private, the town func-
tioned in a manner similar to any other town. Therefore, the owners
could not deprive anyone who entered the town of their constitutional
rights merely because of where the title stood. The Court based its de-
cision on the public function theory that has been applied to the regu-
lation of privately owned public utilities.13 It stated that:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner for his own advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. 14
The Marsh decision was of great importance in the development of
the theory of private property as an available forum for expression. It
was a great step forward when one realizes that the Davis case was the
law up until 1937. However, except for issues coming under the National
Labor Relations Act very little expansion of the Marsh doctrine occurred
until the last few years.' 5
Most of the modern cases in this area are concerned with anti-war
demonstrations on private property that is used by great numbers of
people. In the case of In Re Hoffman16 the petitioners were arrested in
a private railroad terminal, while distributing anti-war literature. They
were convicted of violating a loitering statute, and in this case brought
a writ of habeas corpus for their release from prison. The terminal was
owned by three railroad companies. It contained not only transportation
facilities but shops and restaurants which were all freely accessible to
the public. 17 Unlike in Marsh the terminal in Hoffman did not perform
a community function.
The sole issue was whether or not owners had the right to prohibit
the petitioners from exercising their freedom of expression. The Court
stated that an individual's right to freedom of expression cannot be re-
fused merely because the property is not primarily a forum for dissent.
This does not mean that the owners cannot prohibit any activity that
13 Id., 506-8.
14 Id., 506.
15 See Powe v. Miles, 407 F. 2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968), where the court states that
a college football field did not meet the "public function" test in the Marsh case;
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
where the court said that the Columbia University campus also did not meet the
"public function" test in Marsh.
16 434 P. 2d 353 (1967).
17 Id., 354.
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would interrupt the use for which the property was built. As the Court
noted there was no claim by either the owners or the city of any vio-
lation of any legitimate interests.' 8 If this had been the case the petition-
ers could probably have been denied access under the Adderley rule.19
In another terminal case in 1968 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals came to the same conclusion as in the Hoffman case, but went
a little further and established some interesting further guidelines.
20
The factual situation in this case was similar to Hoffman except that the
terminal was created under the authority of a state statute. However,
in light of Hoffman the same principles should apply if the terminal was
completely private.
One of the crucial questions that the Court faced was whether or
not the character of the terminal was such to make it an appropriate
place to express one's First Amendment rights. It was shown that even
though the terminal was not a traditional place for dissent, its character
did make it an appropriate location. The area is utilized by thousands
of people who use the terminal for many reasons other than just taking
a bus. The very purpose of its existence is connected with noise and
other commotion. It was shown that glee clubs had performed concerts
and the terminal had housed merchandise exhibitions. This had all been
done without interference to the other functions of the terminal.2 1
There are two aspects of this decision which may prove to be im-
portant in future cases in this area. The first, that ideas generated from
the demonstrations need not relate to the function of the terminal. The
particular place used for the expression of First Amendment rights may
be chosen solely because it is where the relevant audience is situated.
In this case the petitioner was attempting to reach not just the general
public but the servicemen coming into New York from Fort Dix as
well.22 The second, the determination that the mere presence of a roof
over the terminal would not make it an inappropriate location to ex-
press one's opinions. The Court said, "Indeed the public forum is surely
as traditionally a covered meeting hall as a sunlit arena." 23
From a careful examination of the Hoffman and Port Authority
cases certain basic concepts can be derived. Merely because the forum
is on private property rather than public property does not mean an
owner can automatically prevent an individual from expressing his First
Amendment rights. However, this must be qualified by saying that the
property must conform to certain characteristic standards. All litigation
18 Id., 356.
19 Adderley v. Florida, supra n. 9.
20 Wolin v. Port Authority of New York, 392 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
21 Id., 89-90.
22 Id., 90.
23 Ibid.
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in this area has stated the property must be freely accessible with no
restrictions as to entry. In dealing with a railroad or bus terminal there
is little trouble in determining the high degree of accessibility. In both
Hoffman and Port Authority it was established that thousands of people
used the facilities daily.
An earlier case dealing with this theory involved a demonstration
within the grounds of the 1964 World's Fair in New York.24 Similar to
Hoffman and Port Authority there were large numbers of people and no
alleged problem of interference. However, accessibility was limited due
to the fences surrounding the grounds. The same Court which heard the
Port Authority case in this opinion upheld the position of the Fair man-
agement. It said that the differentiating factors were the fences and
ticket windows which surrounded the area. It was felt by the Court
that the grounds were not so completely open as to bring this case under
the Marsh rule.25 The fact that the demonstrators had agreed to pay the
price of admission did not change the status of the forum.
Another area where private property owners have attempted to
limit freedom of speech has been in shopping centers. In most instances
the conflict developed from attempts by labor unions to picket. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has handed down a decision, Amalga-
mated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., which should defin-
itively settle many of the questions in this area.26 In that case an em-
ployer obtained an injunction in state court prohibiting the union from
peaceful picketing of a supermarket within a shopping center. The prop-
erty in question was on a large area containing two stores, a large park-
ing lot and sidewalks for pedestrians. At each end of the parking lot
were state owned highways, which the public used to enter the area.
There was no controversy over the fact that the shopping center was
freely accessible with no restrictions on entry. The sole issue was
whether or not the state trespass laws could be used to limit First
Amendment rights. The Court came to the conclusion that the area in
question was quite similar to the downtown area in the Marsh case.
Therefore, there was no reason to distinguish between the two cases. 27
Here the union was protesting the hiring practices of the employer. The
Court limited its decision by stating that:
The state may not delegate the power, through the use of its tres-
pass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing
to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a man-
ner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which
the property is actually put.28
24 Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
25 Id., 161.
26 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
27 Id., 319.
28 Id., 319-20.
May, 1970
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The Court left open the subject of whether or not First Amendment
rights could be limited if the ideas generated had no bearing on the
function of the property, a serious problem in light of the protest move-
ments today, e.g., the anti-war movement and the California grape boy-
cott. It is interesting to note, however, that the Port Authority case
29
provided a possible answer. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the
Port Authority Terminal was a proper location for the expression of
First Amendment rights, stated that a proper forum may be ".... where
the relevant audience may be found." 30 Furthermore, a Federal District
Court has recently held that the distribution of anti-war leaflets in a
shopping center constituted a valid extension of the Logan Valley de-
cision.3
0a
A few states have reached conclusions similar to that reached in
Logan Valley.31 In one case the California Supreme Court decided that
a union did have the right to picket within a shopping center.3 2 In that
case the employer sought an injunction to prevent the union from picket-
ing his place of business. The employer, however, was merely a lessee
within the shopping center. The court held that the plaintiff did not have
exclusive possession of the parking lot and the sidewalks since he was
only a tenant. Therefore, he was not in a position to prohibit the union
from exercising its First Amendment rights.33
In another recent decision the California Supreme Court expanded
their doctrine to include an individual grocery store that was not a part
of a larger shopping center.34 The area in question was a private sidewalk
which was adjacent to the store. After discussing both Marsh and Logan
Valley the Court concluded that there was no distinction between those
cases and the area in question.35
All of the cases found in this area have dealt with the public areas
around outdoor shopping centers. Today, much construction is concen-
trated on the indoor-mall type of shopping centers. These malls are
usually fully heated in the winter and air conditioned during the sum-
mer months. Although they serve the same purpose as their outdoor
counterparts, the question still remains as to whether or not the Logan
Valley and Port Authority concepts would apply. The Circuit Court of
29 Wolin v. Port Authority of New York, supra n. 24.
30 Id., 90.
30a Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 38 U.S.L.W. 2427 (USDC Ore. 1-15-70).
31 Schwartz-Torrance Investment Co. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 40 Cal. Rep. 233,
394 P. 2d 921 (1962); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Cen-
ter, 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W. 2d 785 (1963).
32 Nachas v. Local 905 Retail Clerks International, 144 Cal. 2d 808, 301 P. 2d 932
(1956).
33 Id., 940.
34 In Re Lane, 74 Cal. Rep. 721, 457 P. 2d 561 (1969).
35 Id., 724, 564.
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Appeals in the Port Authority case said, "Indeed the public forum is
surely as traditionally a covered meeting hall as a sunlit arena." 36 The
Port Authority case can be distinguished from the indoor mall situation
in that the terminal's main function was transportation, which is a regu-
lated public utility rather than a purely private enterprise. This dis-
tinction should not be carried too far, as in both the terminal and the
indoor mall, the owners had opened the area for public use. They had
attempted to attract all segments of the public without any restriction
as to accessibility. Furthermore, the owners of the shops and restaurants
within the Port Authority serve the same function as their counterparts
in the indoor mall shopping center.
Another area where there has been litigation is in connection with
private apartment buildings. This is an interesting area as some careful
distinctions have been made. In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.37 a Jehovah's Witness attempted to dis-
tribute handbills in an apartment complex owned by the defendant. The
complex was an entire residential community, as it was situated on 129
acres of land and housed 35,000 people. There was a company restriction
on door-to-door solicitation. The Court, in distinguishing this situation
from the Marsh case, stated that a hallway in an upper part of an apart-
ment building is hardly the same as the streets in the company town in
Marsh.38 But, in Commonwealth v. Richardson"9 a Massachusetts court
reversed a trespass conviction brought against a Jehovah's Witness for
soliciting in an apartment building after being told to leave by the own-
ers. The unique factual situation here should be noted. In the building
there was an outer vestibule that could be entered by an open door.
Between the vestibule and the hallway was a locked security door. A
visitor would ring a bell and the tenant could release the lock on the
door while still in his apartment. The Court stated:
But apart from this we think that by supplying the means of seeking
access to the tenants by way of the bells which could ring in the
vestibule an implied license was granted to the defendants and all
others engaged in lawful pursuits to make use of them for the pur-
pose of seeking an interview with the tenants.40
In effect, the Jehovah's Witness had at least an implied license to enter
the hallway and speak to the tenant who had released the security door.
A California court was able to distinguish the Richardson case when
applied to a boarding house.41 It said that the guests were not tenants
36 Supra n. 24, 90.
37 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E. 2d 433 (1948).
38 Id., 342, 436.
39 48 N.E. 2d 678 (1943).
40 Id., 682.
41 People v. Vaughan, 150 P. 2d 964 (1944).
May, 1970
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and that the owner had complete control over the entrance to the lobby
and the halls. Under these circumstances he could prohibit solicitors
from obtaining interviews with the occupants.
The Private University
Most of the cases dealing with the problem of free speech on univer-
sity property have attempted to establish the concept of state action,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Probably the prevailing atti-
tude among the courts today concerning discipline in private universities
appeared in an opinion by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. That court said in Green v. Howard University: 42
It would be a sad blow to the institutions of higher learning and to
the development of independent thought and culture, if the court
were to step in and control and direct the administration of disci-
pline.
43
In the case of Evers v. Birdsong a Federal District Court ruled that
school campuses are not public in the same sense as streets, courthouses,
and public parks for the expression of First Amendment rights.44 In
another university case a group of students from Columbia University
sought an injunction to restrain school officials from taking disciplinary
action against them. The students had occupied a group of university
buildings on campus.45 They argued that the university performed a
"public function" similar to the "company town" in the Marsh case. The
court distinguished this problem from Marsh by stating that Marsh and
the other cases indicated only the extent to which private property
necessarily used by the public may be subject to constitutional limita-
tions.
46
The courts have said that, if there is lacking a general invitation to
enter the property, protection may not be available. The college campus
is not fully accessible to the general public, the restriction being admis-
sion to the university. However, it seems the courts have failed to con-
sider the function of the university to the students who are enrolled and
live on campus. To this group the university does have a public function
similar to that in Marsh. This is especially true in the case of our large
universities which are really cities within themselves. On many of our
large campuses there are stores, restaurants, places of entertainment, and
everything else that is found in a community. Therefore, it may be very
difficult to find a difference between a "company town" and the univer-
sity community.
42 271 F. Supp. 609 (Dist. Col. 1967).
43 Id., 615.
44 287 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
45 Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46 Id., 549.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
19 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)
New Approaches
When dealing with new and expanding areas such as the use of
private property as a public forum, it is interesting to speculate what
new arguments may emerge in the years ahead. The most fertile area
for new case law in this field has been a series of cases under the National
Labor Relations Act. These cases deal with the right of employers to
limit the free speech of employees on company owned property.
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B.47 an employer had a "no
soliciting" policy for employees. One employee was fired after being
warned about soliciting for union membership. Other employees were
released for the mere wearing of union buttons. In a companion case
(Le Tourneau v. N. L. R. B.) decided at the same time, an employee was
fired for distributing union literature in the company parking lot during
his lunch hour.48 The United States Supreme Court, in both cases, up-
held the N. L. R. B. in stating that the company policy was a restriction
on speech within the National Labor Relations Act.49 When the Le
Tourneau case was before the N. L. R. B., the Board said:
Upon all the above considerations we are convinced and find that
the respondent in applying its no distributing rule to the distribution
of union literature by its employees on its parking lots has placed
an unreasonable impediment on the freedom of communication
essential to the exercise of its employees to self organization .... 0
This doctrine was later limited in N. L. R. B. v. Babcock and Wilcox
Co.51 This case concerned the right of non-employees to distribute union
literature in company parking lots. The United States Supreme Court
here reversed the N. L. R. B., stating that there is an important distinc-
tion between employees and non-employees.52 An employer could limit
the expression of non-employees on the employer's property. However,
the Court said an exception would exist where there was no other effec-
tive means of communication to establish contact with the employees. 53
Perhaps the most helpful case in this area in future argument will
be Marshall Field Co. v. N. L. R. B ., 4 which dealt with a major depart-
ment store rather than a factory. The case was concerned with the right
of non-employees to solicit union membership within the store. Follow-
ing the Babcock and Wilcox 55 precedent the court ruled that the owners
47 324 U.S. 793 (1944).
48 324 U.S. 793 (1944).
49 Id., 802.
50 In the matter of Le Tourneau Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1943).
51 351 U.S. 105 (1955).
52 Id., 113.
53 Id., 112.
54 200 F. 2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953).
55 N.L.R.B. v. Babcock and Wilcox, supra n. 51.
May, 1970
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could prohibit the action within the main part of the store. However,
the court felt that the Babcock and Wilcox rule did not apply to a street
that led into the store, and which was owned by the company. The court
felt that this was a public thoroughfare, and therefore the owners could
not limit the expression of non-employees on that public thoroughfare.
Conclusion
In review, it can be said that there has been a great expansion in
the concept of the use of private property as a forum for expression. The
old theories of absolute property rights have taken on a new look. No
longer can it be assumed that expression can be limited solely because
the forum is on private property. It is now apparent that the constitu-
tional right to freedom of speech has reached an even more preferred
status within our law. How far this will continue, only time will tell.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1970
